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Thinking Outside the Civil Case Box: Reformulating
Pretrial Conference Laws
Jeffrey A. Parness*& Matthew R. Walker*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In an American trial court of general or special subject matter jurisdiction, a civil case typically is commenced by filing with the court a
complaint or some other affirmative pleading.' Within an initial pleading there should be presented, at least, "a claim for relief' 2 or "a cause
4
of action" 3 by a named party who seeks redress from an adverse party.
Initial pleadings, and any subsequent requests for redress within or related to pleadings,5 usually should be processed and heard so as to se6
cure "just, speedy, and inexpensive" resolution.
Frequently, a civil case is resolved through settlement or trial. To
facilitate such resolution, a trial judge possesses authority to schedule
settlement or trial preparation conferences. Written civil procedure laws
explicitly recognize judicial authority to compel attendance by the attorneys for the parties and, at times, by the parties themselves at settlement
conferences, as well as to compel attendance by the attorneys and by
unrepresented parties at trial preparation conferences.
While the civil case box described in written civil procedure laws
normally references only presented claims and their named parties and
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby College, J.D.,
The University of Chicago.
** B.A. Northern Illinois University, J.D., Northern Illinois University (expected 2002).
1. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 3 (requiring a complaint to be filed); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-

602 (1992) (same); Mo. R. CIv. P. § 53.01 (requiring a petition to be filed).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
3. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-602 (1992). While the phrase "cause of action" generally is
employed with fact pleading, "claim for relief' usually accompanies notice pleading. See generally
Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253 (describing the differences and proposing to amend Rule
8(a)(2) to require pleading of "facts constituting a cause of action").
4. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2H3) (requiring "a short and plain statement of the claim"
and "a demand for judgment"); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-601, 603(a) (1992) (requiring "a plain and
concise statement" of a cause of action wherein "substantial allegations of fact are necessary"); TEX.
R. Civ. P. 47(a) (requiring "a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of
the claim involved").
5. Later requests may be written, as in amendments to initial pleadings or in third-party
pleadings. FED. R. CiV. P. 15(a), 14(a). Unwritten later requests may be made where unpleaded
claims are "tried by express or implied consent of the parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
6. FED. R. CI. P. 1.
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attorneys, many civil cases also involve unpresented claims (i.e., insurance coverage) and other interests (i.e., contingency fee recovery) far
removed from any claims presented in pleadings or elsewhere. Here,
nonparties and their attorneys can be quite important to civil case resolution. Unpresented claims and nonparty interests should also be handied with a view toward "just, speedy, and inexpensive" resolution. Efficient disposition here too can be facilitated by pretrial conferences.
Yet, written civil procedure laws typically are silent on pretrial conferences directed at unpresented claims and nonparty interests. While, undoubtedly there is at least some scheduling authority regarding unpresented and nonparty matters, it often goes unrecognized or unemployed
due, in part, to the silence of the written laws.
Written pretrial conference laws for civil cases in both federal and
state trial courts should be reformulated to encompass matters beyond
presented claims and named parties. Judgments upon settlements or
trials often speak to lienholders, insurers, and other nonparties. To secure "just, speedy, and inexpensive" resolution, written laws should reflect better all the matters for which pretrial conferences might be
scheduled.
As the written laws are significantly influenced by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, we review historically the guidelines on pretrial conferences within the Federal Rules. Then we demonstrate, utilizing the
United States Supreme Court decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America7 on ancillary jurisdiction and inherent power,
how all federal rules have failed to address fully judicial authority on
pretrial conferencing and how these failures have led to misunderstandings and troubling precedents. We then explain how Kokkonen should
be properly understood, which we hope will clarify future analysis. We
conclude with suggestions for reformulating all written pretrial conference laws to include matters beyond presented claims and named parties, so as to secure more "just, speedy, and inexpensive" resolution of
all civil litigation matters.8

7. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).

8. We shall not address when, how and why such broader pretrial conference laws should be
used. For such a discussion, see generally Leonard L. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference. The Lessons ofG. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U.L.Q.
1059 (1991).
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THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ON PRETRIAL
CONFERENCES

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, effective in 1938, was entitled
"Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues." 9 It made no explicit mention of settlement, though settlement presumably was discussed during
many pretrial conferences. As written, the Rule was geared to trial
preparation conferences.10 The Rule allowed the district court to "direct
the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider" subjects that would "aid in the disposition of the action," including issue simplification, pleading amendment, avoidance of "unnecessary
proof," "limitation" on experts, and referrals of factual issues to masters.11

9. The text of the 1938 version of Rule 16 is found in Rules of Civil Procedurefor the District
Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645, 684 (1938) [hereinafter 1938 Rule] and reads as follows:
Rule 16. Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues.
In any action, the court may at its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear
before it for a conference to consider
(1)The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings to
be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any
of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by
admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The
court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions may be
placed for consideration as above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury
actions or to non-jury actions or extend it to all actions.
10. See Hon. Alfred P. Murrah, Pre-TrialProcedure:A Statement of Its Essentials, 14 F.R.D.
417, 424 (noting that the U.S. Judicial Conference in 1944 approved the Pre-Trial Committee's
statement "that settlement is a by-product of good pre-trial procedure rather than a primary objective
to be actively pursued by the judge"); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,Jurisdictionas Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article II1, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 935-36 (2000) (stating that the 1938
Rule was intended to cover meetings about coming trials).
11. 1938 Rule, supranote 9, 308 U.S. at 684. The 1938 version of the Rule operates today in
some American states. ARK. R. Civ. P. 16; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-16 (1993); KY. R. Civ. P. 16;
MASS. R. Civ. P. 16; Miss. R. Civ. P. 16; Mo. R. Civ. P. 62.01; N.C.R. CIv. P. 16; PA. R. Civ. P.
212.3; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-16 (Michie 2001); VT. R. Civ. P. 16; VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:13;
WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 16.
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Rule 16 remained unchanged until 198312 when it was significantly
overhauled.' 3 Its title then read "Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management."' 14 While the original Rule designated six subjects for possible
16
consideration, 15 the new Rule listed five objectives and eleven subjects.
The new Rule contemplated required scheduling and planning conferences early on for many civil cases as well as the prospect of multiple
conferences thereafter.' 7 Judicial authority was broadened to reach not
only attorneys, but also "any unrepresented parties."' 8 Discovery, pretrial motion, and settlement matters, as well as trial preparation matters,
could now guide pretrial conferences.' 9
The 1983 Rule expressly made "facilitating the settlement of the
case" a legitimate objective of a pretrial conference. 20 The "participants" at any conference could "consider and take action" on a variety
of subjects, including "the possibility of settlement."' 21 There is no language in the 1983 Rule describing all possible participants. 22 The Rule
did say that "[a]t least one of the attorneys for each party participating in
any conference before trial shall have authority to enter into stipulations
and to make admissions regarding all matters that the participants may
23
reasonably anticipate may be discussed."
The Advisory Committee Note to the 1983 Rule, prepared by the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and first submitted to the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 24 found that settlement discussions at pretrial
conferences had "become commonplace" 25 and were "appropriate at
12. There was a proposal in 1955 to broaden a judge's power in "big case[s]" where "protracted
16
litigation" was expected. 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
App.02[1] (3d ed. 2001).
13. FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 201-05 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Rule].
This version of the Rule operates today in some American states. ALA. R. Civ. P. 16; MONT. R.
Civ. P. 16; N.M.R. Civ. P. DIST. CT. 1-016; UTAH R. Civ. P. 16.
14. 1983 Rule, supra note 13, 97 F.R.D. at 201.
15. 1938 Rule, supra note 9, 308 U.S. at 684.
16. 1983 Rule, supra note 13, 97 F.R.D. at 201-05.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 201.

19. Id. at 207 advisory committee's note.
20. Id. at 201; FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
21. 1983 Rule, supra note 13, 97 F.R.D. at 202-03; FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (1983) (repealed
1993).
22. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 667 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (Manion, J., dissenting) ("Rule 16(c) does not say who those 'participants' may be.").
23. 1983 Rule, supra note 13, 97 F.R.D. at 204.
24. Id. at 189 conference committee's report; see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (creating the
Judicial Conference of the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1994) (creating a standing committee on rules of practice, procedure, and evidence).
25. 1983 Rule, supranote 13, 97 F.R.D. at 210 advisory committee's note.
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any time." 26 It further said that a pretrial conference devoted exclusively
to settlement "may be desirable" and that "settlement should be facili'27
tated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible.
This Advisory Committee viewed the 1938 Rule as "a success," in
part, because it improved and facilitated the "settlement process." 28 Yet,
it found the 1938 Rule had become outdated because it did not reflect
"the significant changes in federal civil litigation." 29 The Advisory
Committee said that "the amendment explicitly recognizes some of the
objectives of pretrial conferences and the powers that many courts already have assumed" and "thus will be a more accurate reflection of actual practice. '30 The Committee did caution, however, that mandating
'31
settlement conferences "would be a waste of time in many cases.
Rule 16 was last amended in 1993,32 with the most
recent changes
constituting more refinement than overhaul. The Rule now enumerates
sixteen subjects "for consideration at pretrial conferences. '33 The new
Rule also contemplates a more active role for judges. While in 1983 the
"participants" at a pretrial conference would "consider and take action"
with respect to the subjects discussed, in 1993 "the court" was to "take
appropriate action" regarding the subjects considered. 34
The 1993 Rule also expressly authorizes judges to "require that a
party or its representative be present or reasonably available by telephone in order to consider possible settlement of the dispute." 35 The
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
changes

Id.
Id.
Id. at 205-06 advisory committee's note.
Id. at 206 advisory committee's note.
Id. at 207 advisory committee's note.
Id. at 210 advisory committee's note.
See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 597-601 (1993) (showing the
made to Rule 16) [hereinafter 1993 Rule]. This version of the Rule operates today in some

American states. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 16; HAW. R. Civ. P. 16; KAN. R. Civ. P. 60-216; MiNN. R.
Civ. P. 16.01-16.06; N.D.R. Civ. P. 16; TENN. R. CIv. P. 16.01-16.06; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 16; WYO.
R. Civ. P. 16.
33. 1993 Rule, supra note 32, 146 F.R.D. at 598-601.
34. Id. at 598-99. Subdivision (c) under the 1983 Rule read: "(c) Subjects to be Discussed at
Pretrial Conferences. The participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to the subjects discussed." 1983 Rule, supra note 13, 97 F.R.D. at 202. The 1993
Rule reads: "(c) Subjects for Consideration at Pretrial Conferences. At any conference under this
rule consideration may be given, and the court may take appropriate action, with respect to the subjects considered." 1993 Rule, supranote 32, 146 F.R.D. at 598-99; FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
35. 1993 Rule, supra note 32, 146 F.R.D. at 601; FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c). The Advisory Committee explained that this addition was expressly directed at the settlement provision, stating that
"paragraph (9) should be read in conjunction with the sentence added to the end of subdivision (c)."
1993 Rule, supra note 32, 146 F.R.D. at 604-05 advisory committee's note. This portion of the
amendments to Rule 16 seems contrary to the Advisory Committee notes to the 1983 amendments,

. KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

Advisory Committee explained that this change would help "eliminate
questions... regarding the authority of the court to make appropriate
orders.., to facilitate settlement." 36 The Committee noted that participation by a party or its representative might involve "an officer of a corporate party, a representative from an insurance carrier, or someone
else," depending upon the circumstances. 37 The Committee also said
that the "explicit authorization to require personal participation" was
not meant "to limit the reasonable exercise of the court's inherent pow38
ers."
The 1993 Rule received some criticism. There was concern "that
explicit authority to require party attendance at settlement conferences
would be misused by some judges to coerce settlements. '39 The rulemakers did not proceed with a few suggested changes. Eliminated was a
provision explicitly authorizing "mandatory attendance and participation" of interested insurers in alternative dispute resolution procedures. 40 While the rulemakers did not push an amendment expressly
authorizing district courts to require "insurers" to attend pretrial conferences, 41 the Committee noted "the strong feelings of many" that
authority "to require that parties, or their insurers, attend a settlement
conference" was not only "needed," but also "already within the court's
inherent powers."42

Judicial authority over insurers, and perhaps other

which state in regard to the last sentence in subsection (c) that "[t]he reference to 'authority' is not
intended to insist upon the ability to settle the litigation." 1983 Rule, supranote 13, at 211 advisory
committee's note.
36. 1993 Rule, supra note 32, 146 F.R.D. at 603 advisory committee's note.
37. Id. at 605 advisory committee's note. The Committee left open who "someone else" might
be. Id.
38. Id. The Committee cites G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th
Cir. 1989) (en ban6), on inherent powers. 1993 Rule, supra note 32, 146 F.R.D. at 605 advisory
committee's note. The Committee warned, however, "that the unwillingness of a party to be available, even by telephone, for a settlement conference may be a clear signal that the time and expense
involved in pursuing settlement is likely to be unproductive and that personal participation by the
parties should not be required." Id.
39. Letter from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to
Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 146
F.R.D. 519, 526, Attachment B, "Issues and Changes" (May 1, 1992).
40. Id.(noting that such mandates may arise under "local experimentation under the Civil Justice Reform Act"). That proposal appears in ProposedRules, 137 F.R.D. 53, 85 (1991).
41. See Proposed Rules, supranote 40, 137 F.R.D. at 85 ("The court may require that parties,
or their representatives and insurers, attend a conference ....
").
42. 1993 Rule, supra note 32, 146 F.R.D. at 526 advisory committee's note. A detailed history
of Rule 16 is found in Resnik, supranote 10:
Throughout the century, some judges and lawyers surely met with each other and
talked about settling cases. Settlement was-and is-always on the table ....The shift
I have traced begins in the 1920s, runs through rulemaking in the 1930s, protracted litigation in the 1950s, and schools for judges in the following decades, and finds current
expression in the comments of a federal judge explaining in 1994 to lawyers at a federal
bar meeting in Los Angeles that going to trial meant that "the system" had failed.
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nonparties, during pretrial conferencing thus remains subject to case
precedents.
III. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY UNDER Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance
Co. ofAmerica
Judicial authority during settlement and trial preparation conferences
in the federal trial courts, at times extending beyond any written laws,
was described in the United States Supreme Court decision in Kokkonen
v. GuardianLife Insurance Co. ofAmerica,43 rendered a year after Rule 16
was last amended. There, the Court recognized limits on trial court enforcement authority over civil case settlement agreements. 44 Yet the
Court in Kokkonen went further, inviting pretrial conferences involving,
at times, unpresented claims and interests as well as nonpartie. 45 Such
conferences are exemplified in the Matsushita46 and Cluett47 cases, which
follow a review of Kokkonen.
A, The Two Heads of Kokkonen
The civil litigation parties in Kokkonen, involved in a dispute over an
agency relationship concerning insurance sales, orally agreed, on the record before a federal district judge in chambers, to resolve all claims and
counterclaims.4 8 The parties then executed, and the district judge
signed, a stipulation and order dismissing the diversity action. 49 The
order did not reserve jurisdiction to enforce the agreement; it did not
even mention the agreement.50 Subsequently, a dispute arose under the
agreement when the petitioner failed to return certain files to the insurer. 51 The insurer moved in the same district court to enforce the
Id at 949.
43. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
44. Id. at 381-82.

45. See id. (recognizing courts' ability to "embody" the terms of settlement contracts in dismissal orders). Additionally, the court recognized that ancillary jurisdiction includes the authority to
compel a lawyer engaged in litigation misconduct to pay an opposing party's attorney's fees. Id. at
380 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,45 (1991)).
46. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
47. Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. CPC Acquisition Co., 863 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1988).
48. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376.
49. Id. at 376-77.
50. Id.at 377.
51. Id.
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agreement. 52 The court enforced the agreement under its "inherent
power" over the objection that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-

tion.5

3

The Supreme Court reversed. In assessing the lower court's reference to "inherent power," the Court focused on but one of the "two
54
separate, though sometimes related.., heads" of ancillary jurisdiction.
The Court generally found that "ancillary jurisdiction" had been used
in the very broad sense ... for two separate, though sometimes related, purposes: (1)to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying
respects and degrees, factually interdependent; and, (2) to enable a court to
function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees. 55

The Court held that neither purpose "supports the present assertion
of jurisdiction." 56 As to "factually interdependent" claims, the Court
found, and the parties did not dispute, that the facts relating to the
"breach of agency" complaint and to the "breach of settlement agreement [had] nothing to do with each other." 57 As to successful court
functioning, seemingly relied on by the insurer seeking enforcement of
the settlement, 58 the Court found that if the settlement agreement "had
been made part of the order of dismissal," the situation would be "quite
different. '59 Then any breach would either violate a specific court order

52. Id.
53. Id.

54. Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted).
55. Id. (citations omitted). While the Kokkonen Court described "ancillary jurisdiction" and
"inherent power" as including the parameters of judicial authority to decide claims and related issues
arising in civil cases, elsewhere the Court seemingly has recognized other forms of inherent powers.
In Mistrettav. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), Justice Scalia wrote:
The whole theory of lawful congressional "delegation" is not that Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore assign its responsibility of making law to
someone else; but rather that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to determine-up to a point-how small or
how large that degree shall be. Thus, the courts could be given the power to say precisely
what constitutes a "restraint of trade," or to adopt rules of procedure, or to prescribe by
rule the manner in which their officers shall execute their judgments, because that "lawmaking" was ancillary to their exercise of judicial powers.
Id.
at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
57. Id.

58. See id. ("But it is the second head of ancillary jurisdiction, relating to the court's power to
protect its proceedings and vindicate its authority, that both courts in the present case appear to have
relied upon, judging from their references to 'inherent power."') (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 381.

2002]

THINKING OUTSIDE THE CIVIL CASE Box

or fall under a retention of subject matter jurisdiction. 60 The Court concluded, however, that absent such incorporation, "enforcement of the
6
settlement agreement is for state courts." '
The Court in Kokkonen understood that the types of ancillary and
inherent judicial authority it described had been and would continue to
be troublesome. It said that "ancillary jurisdiction can hardly be criticized for being overly rigid or precise." 62 Imprecision seemingly results,
in part, because inherent and ancillary powers are not wholly derived
from "rule or statute but [from] the control necessarily vested in courts
to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases."'63 While these doctrines encompass broader powers than expressly recognized under written civil procedure laws, 64 these
65
powers often seem "murky. '
Recognizing the potential for misunderstanding and abuse, the Supreme Court has urged caution in employing these doctrines. After
Kokkonen, it has said that inherent and ancillary judicial authority "must
be delimited with care, for there is a danger of overreaching when one
branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction from the others, undertakes to define its own authority." 66 Yet, the
60. Id. Judicial enforcement of civil case settlements occasionally is directed by written civil
procedure laws. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (West Supp. 2001).
61. Kokkonen,511 U.S. at 382.
62. Id. at 379.
63. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1991) (noting that inherent powers of the federal courts include power to admit
to the bar, discipline attorneys who appear before the court, punish for contempt, vacate a judgment
on proof of fraud, bar disruptive criminal defendants, dismiss a case on forum non conveniens
grounds, and act sua sponte to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute).
64. See, e.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47-48 (noting that inherent power can be used, inter alia,
to expand sanctioning authority granted by Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
65. HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 882 F. Supp. 60, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The HBE court is not
alone in its confusion:
Despite historical reliance on inherent powers, including Supreme Court jurisprudence dating back to 1812, the notion of inherent power has been described as nebulous,
and its bounds as "shadowy." The conceptual and definitional problems... have bedeviled commentators for years .... [V]ery few federal cases discuss in detail the topic of
inherent powers. More importantly, those cases that have employed inherent power appear to use that generic term to describe several distinguishable court powers. To compound this lack of specificity, courts have relied occasionally on precedents involving
one form of power to support the court's use of another.
These observations suggest that it is not always possible to categorize inherent power
decisions.
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561-62 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (citations and footnotes omitted).
66. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996). In Degen, the Court describes inherent
authority as "power... limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise." Id.at 829.
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dangers must be faced because such judicial authority "is, at its core, a
67
creature of necessity."
We posit that the doctrines of ancillary and inherent powers are best
understood as involving two distinct forms of judicial authority, each
capable of operating without express language in written civil procedure
laws. One, which we frnd often is labeled ancillary, pendent, or most
recently, supplemental jurisdiction, involves initial judicial authority over
disputed civil claims, 68 though all such claims may not be able to be resolved on the merits at a trial should trial become necessary. The other,
which we find often is labeled inherent power, involves the determination and implementation of the processes necessary for the resolution of
69
the disputed civil claims in a "just, speedy, and inexpensive" manner.
These two forms of judicial authority are illustrated in the following two
cases. The first, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,70 shows
how the first head of Kokkonen allows court involvement in settlement
talks about factually interdependent claims which could not be brought
to trial or otherwise resolved by the same court if no settlement is
71
reached. The other, Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. CPC Acquisition Co.,
shows how the second head of Kokkonen can be employed both to hear
and to resolve unpresented civil claims and interests that are not factually interdependent with the disputed civil claims, and that may involve
nonparties, so that the court can resolve the disputed civil claims in a
fair, efficient, and cost effective manner. We believe that at least some
of the confusion over the two forms of judicial authority would dissipate
if ancillary jurisdiction was viewed as a form of judicial authority involving initial subject matter jurisdiction over factually interdependent
(if not also factually-related) claims, while inherent power was viewed as
a form of judicial authority encompassing varying powers necessary for
72
resolving such claims.
67. Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 (1996).
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994) (prescribing the claims over which the federal district courts
have supplemental jurisdiction).

69. FED. R. Civ. P.1.

70. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
71. 863 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1988).
72. While the term ancillary jurisdiction as used in Kokkonen includes many asserted exercises
of inherent powers, we employ the term only to cover authority over non-diversity state law claims
and interests in some significant way factually related to the civil claims properly pending before
federal district courts under independent jurisdictional statutes. Such ancillary authority includes,
but is not limited to, supplemental jurisdiction over claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Cf Futura Dev.,
Inc. v. Estado Libre Asociado, 144 F.3d 7, 9 n.1 (1st Cir. 1998) (utilizing the term "supplemental
jurisdiction" to cover federal court authority over related state law claims and the term "enforcement
jurisdiction" to cover inherent authority necessary for courts to function successfully, without mentioning nonenforcement proceedings involving vindication and management also necessary for suc-
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B. The Matsushita and Cluett Cases
The dispute in Matsushita arose when Matsushita sought a takeover
of MCA. 73 A class action was instituted in a Delaware Court of Chancery on behalf of the MCA stockholders alleging that MCA and its
board of directors had failed to maximize the value of MCA stock and
had failed to disclose a conflict of interest between the managers of
MCA and Matsushita. 74 After the Delaware class action was initiated, a
second group of plaintiffs filed a related class action in a California federal district court alleging violations of federal Security and Exchange
75
Commission rules.
Before the California federal case was heard, Matsushita offered a
settlement involving a dismissal of the Delaware state action and a release of all claims, including the federal claims then pending in the California action. 76 The Delaware court refused to approve the agreement
because there was no monetary benefit to the class members. 77 The
Delaware judge determined that it would be unfair to release all claims
under a settlement that had no monetary value to class members because the federal claims had arguable merit. 78 After the agreement was
rejected, the California court declined to certify the class. 79 This decision was then appealed. 80 Before that appeal was heard, however, the
Delaware class action was settled, with the agreement including a release
81
of any federal claims.
Individuals within both the Delaware and California classes that had
neither opted out of the Delaware class nor appeared at the hearings in
Delaware to contest the settlement or class representation then sought
cessful court function), vacated by U.S.I. Props. Corp. v. M.D. Constr. Co., 230 F.3d 489 (1st Cir.
2000).

73. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 369-70 (explaining that there was a tender offer that resulted in
Matsushita acquiring MCA).
74. In re MCA, Inc., 598 A.2d 687, 690 (Del. Ch. 1991). There were also claims involving
wasting assets and conspiring to break Delaware law. Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 370.
75. MCA, 598 A.2d at 690.
76. Id. at 690.
77. Id. at 696.

78. Id. at 695-96. While state judicial consideration of the strength of the federal law claims on

the merits may seem to invade the exclusivity of federal court authority, it also seems necessary in
order to assure that the settlement was fair to the absent class members.
79. Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 370.

80. Id.

81. Id. at 370-71. The settlement agreement contained an opt-out provision and a $2 million
deposit to be distributed to class members. Id. at 371.
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to proceed further in the California case.8 2 The United States Supreme
Court had to determine if the Delaware court judgment should be refused full faith and credit by a federal court because it contained a release of federal law claims within exclusive federal court subject matter
jurisdiction.8 3 The Supreme Court held that deference generally is "applicable in cases in which the state-court judgment . . incorporates a
class-action settlement releasing claims solely within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts."8 4 Since the agreement would preclude any proceedings in Delaware state courts, the agreement was found by the Su85
preme Court to be preclusive in the federal courts as we.
In allowing a state court judge to oversee and approve a class settlement containing claims within exclusive federal district court subject
matter jurisdiction,8 6 the Matsushita decision allows the state court to
exercise at least some ancillary authority over factually interdependent
claims so that it may dispose of all related claims in a single proceeding,8 7 though not all claims were suitable for adjudication by a state court
trial. State court ancillary authority over certain unpresented federal law
claims between named parties is thus appropriate even though the
claims could have been neither pleaded nor tried on the merits in the
state court.
Inherent authority necessary for the trial court to function success88
fully was exercised in Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. CPC Acquisition Co.
There, a fee dispute arose between Paul Bilzerian and the law firm of
Latham and Watkins.8 9 The fees were incurred by Bilzerian during his
attempted takeover of Cluett. 90 The legal services related to the filing of
a California federal court lawsuit to enjoin Cluett from resisting a tender
82. Id. at 372. Had these individuals opted out of the settlement class or objected to the release
of exclusively federal claims in the Delaware state case, they could have proceeded in the California
federal case "unimpeded by the Delaware judgment." Id. at 385. The court noted that those Delaware plaintiff class members who requested exclusion were still proceeding in federal court.

Id.

Incidentally, a few of these individuals unsuccessfully sought in 1999 to intervene for the purpose of
reopening the Delaware court settlement. In re MCA, Inc., 774 A.2d 272, 276 (Del. Ch. 2000). The
court lamented that its "decision is the latest chapter, probably not the last, in this case." Id.

83. Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 369.
84. Id. at 375.
85. See id.at 386 (concluding also that the provision granting exclusive federal jurisdiction

does not effect a partial repeal of the general full faith and credit provision).

86. See id. at 385-86 (noting that similarly exclusive federal claims have been held to be arbi-

trable through an arbitration agreement in lieu of trial in federal court).
87. See In re MCA, Inc., 598 A.2d 687, 691 (Del. Ch. 1991) (referring to settling the state
claims with the federal claims: "As a practical matter, a so-called 'global settlement' is often neces-

sary if any settlement at all will occur.").
88. 863 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1988).
89. Id. at 252-53.
90.

Id.
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offer by Bilzerian and the defense of a New York federal court lawsuit
commenced by Cluett to stop Bilzerian from taking over the company. 91
The fee agreement bound Bilzerian to pay the firm a flat rate for the
work of both partners and associates. 92 After the cases settled, Bilzerian
refused to pay all the fees sought by the firm, saying he was defrauded
because he was charged the flat rate for work done by unlicensed attorneys. 93 Bilzerian filed a declaratory judgment action in a California state
court seeking a determination of the disputed legal fees. 94
Yet, the New York federal court heard the fee dispute. Issues were
tried before a jury, which found for Latham and Watkins. 95 On appeal,
Bilzerian argued "that the district court abused its discretion in exercising its ancillary jurisdiction over the fee dispute." 96 The Court of Appeals found the trial court properly exercised its inherent power because
"the fee dispute was properly related to the main action."97 Further, in
rejecting Bilzerian's argument that only the legal fees tied to the New
York lawsuit should have been tried, the appellate court said it "would
have been wasteful and duplicative, under the circumstances, to require
a bifurcated procedure in which part of the fee dispute would be resolved by a federal court in Manhattan and another part by a state court
in Sacramento, California." 98 By allowing all disputes over fees arising
from the attempted Cluett takeover to be heard in New York, the appellate court allowed the two trial courts to function successfully.

91.

Id.

92. Id.at252n.l.
93. Id. at 254. The fees incurred were $354,569, but as part of the settlement agreement
Bilzerian was given $5 million dollars for fees and expenses incurred during his attempted acquisition. Id. at 253-54.
94. Id.at 253.
95. Id. at 254.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 256. The trial court exercised judicial authority over the fee dispute based upon four
factors: (1) the lower court's familiarity with the subject matter; (2) judicial responsibility to protect
court officers; (3) that the convenience of the parties would be equally well served wherever the fee
dispute was litigated; and, (4) judicial economy. Id. While the Cluett court employed the term
"ancillary jurisdiction," id. at 256, we find the judicial authority used in Cluett better placed within
the inherent powers recognized in the later Kokkonen opinion (as related to successful court functioning) as the fee dispute was not "factually interdependent." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1994).
98. Cluett, 863 F.2d at 257. Of course, under its reasoning, the appeals court also would have
recognized possible inherent authority in the pending California federal case over fee disputes related to work in that case, if not in all merger activities.

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

IV. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY DURING PRETRIAL CONFERENCES

We find federal judicial authority can extend under Kokkonen beyond powers expressly recognized in written civil procedure laws. Outside the civil case box, federal trial judges may preside over pretrial settlement conferences involving civil claims that they cannot try on the
merits under Kokkonen. And, they may preside over trials of civil claims
which are not "factually interdependent" under Kokkonen. There was no
written Delaware law used in Matsushita on trial judges facilitating setdements of civil claims they could not try,99 and there was no written
federal law used in Cluett on trial court resolution of related attorney fee
disputes. Such judicial authority should be employed with caution, however, even where appropriate, as there is always a "danger of overreach100
ing."
Where written civil procedure laws on pretrial conferences are silent,
some trial judges do not recognize-or experience discomfort recognizing, even cautiously-additional judicial authority. While some
judges recognize that additional judicial authority may only be exercised
"in harmony" with written rules or statutes, 101 there is significant disagreement among the judges on resolving questions of inconsistency.
While certain judges are quite comfortable going beyond the literal
wording of general pretrial conference laws, finding no inconsistencies,
others are quite reluctant and choose to stay close to the literal terms of
the written law.10 2 Still other judges exercise expansive pretrial
99. DEL. CT. CH. R. 16(a). The Rule, applicable in Matsushita and much like the 1938 Rule,
expressly notes that attorneys and unrepresented parties may be directed to appear for a pretrial
conference to discuss the issues and processes for trial. Id.
100. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996). This danger occurs "when one branch of
the Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction from the others, undertakes to define
its own authority." Id.
101. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging
that a federal district 'court's "substantial inherent power to control and manage its docket .... must,
of course, be exercised in a manner that is in harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure");
see also Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 (recognizing that in a "limited domain of
judicial autonomy, courts may act notwithstanding contrary legislative direction"). As many state
courts are constitutionally established and empowered, unlike the Article III federal courts, some
state courts innately possess much broader inherent powers than their federal court counterparts,
often in areas involving the regulation of legal practice and contempt. See, e.g., Cripe v. Leiter, 703
N.E.2d 100, 104-07 (Il1.1998) (reviewing cases on General Assembly constraints on lawyer conduct
through consumer protection acts and the like, finding differing state court approaches, and suggesting that in Illinois any such constraints would be an unconstitutional intrusion on the high
court's sole authority to regulate and discipline lawyer conduct).
102. Of course, where general pretrial conference laws may be and are supplemented with local
court rules, the stretch of the language in the general laws becomes less crucial. See, e.g., S.D. IND.
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conferencing authority by significantly stretching written laws to fit.
These differing approaches to written civil pretrial conference laws are
illustrated in two federal appellate court decisions, each grounded on the
1983 version of Rule 16, the language of which remains today in several
state civil procedure laws. 103 The decisions show how many trial judges
today may fail to appreciate the types of settlement conferences under
Matsushita and of trial preparation conferences under Cluett.
A. Beyond the Written Laws
In G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,104 the appellate
court went beyond the wording of the 1983 version of Rule 16 to facilitate a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of a pending civil case. A
federal magistrate judge had ordered a Joseph Oat "corporate representative with the authority to settle" to attend a pretrial settlement conference. 105 The only representative from Joseph Oat who appeared was its
attorney. 106 The trial court determined the order was violated and imposed sanctions. 0 7 Joseph Oat contended on appeal that Rule 16 pern-fitted the trial court to order the attendance of only "attorneys for the
parties or any unrepresented parties."' 108
Writing for the majority, Judge Kanne found that Rule 16 did not
"completely describe and limit the power of federal courts," though the
"concept that district courts exercise procedural authority outside the
explicit language of the rules of civil procedure is not frequently documented."'1 9 He reasoned that "the mere absence of language in the federal rules specifically authorizing or describing a particular judicial procedure should not, and does not, give rise to a negative implication of
prohibition." 11 Written civil procedure laws only "form and shape certain aspects of a court's inherent powers, yet allow the continued exerLOCAL R. 16.1(h) ("The Court may require the parties or their agents or insurers to [attend] settlement negotiations.").

103. E.g, ALA. R. Civ. P. 16; MONT. R. Civ. P. 16; N.M.R. Civ. P. DIST. CT. 1-016; UTAH R.
Civ. P. 16.
104. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
105. Id. at 650. Joseph Oat Corp. also raised the argument that they interpreted the order to
mean the attendance of an insurance carrier with the authority to settle should be present. Id. at 656.
106. Id. at 650.
107. Id. The sanction involved the related fees of opposing counsel in the amount of $5860.01
"pursuant to" Rule 16(0. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 651.

110. Id.at 652.
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cise of that power where discretion should be available.""' Judge
Kanne concluded that "Rule 16 is not designed as a device to restrict or
limit the authority of the district judge in the conduct of pretrial conferences. "112

Thus, to Judge Kanne, the breadth of inherent power, "derived
from the very nature and existence" of the judicial office, includes the
"broad field over which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applied."'1 3 "Inherent authority remains the means by which district
judges deal with circumstances not proscribed or specifically addressed
by rule or statute, but which must be addressed to promote the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." ' 1 4 So, to Judge
Kanne, written laws do not limit, but in fact are "enhanced by" inherent
15
judicial power.

B. Staying Within the Written Laws
While Judge Kanne found inherent judicial power could and did
enhance Rule 16, the dissenting judges in Heileman found varying reasons why the use of such power, at least in the pending case, should not
be allowed. Some found that any inherent power should not encompass
mandated attendance by a represented party or its agent at any pretrial
settlement conference.
In dissent, Judge Posner explained that under the written Federal
Rule, the "main purpose of the pretrial conference is to get ready for
trial."116 But, a represented party's presence at a pretrial conference
would only be sought if deemed necessary to facilitate settlement.17
Judge Posner then discussed the "dangers [of] too broad an interpreta8
tion of the federal courts' inherent power" to promote settlement."
One danger involved encouraging "judicial high-handedness ('power
corrupts')."" 9 Also, because people hire attorneys to "economize on
their own investment of time in resolving disputes," there is a danger in
overriding their judgment as judges may "ignore the value of other people's time" in their zeal to settle cases. 120 However, Judge Posner also
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 653.

114. Id.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.at 656.
Id. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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recognized that "die Not brichtEisen ['necessity breaks iron']," finding "a
potentially useful tool for effecting settlement, even if there is some difficulty in finding a legal basis for the tool," should not be easily discarded, especially when trial judges face "heavy" workloads. 2' Judge
Posner did not further explore the contours of the 1983 version of Rule
16 as he found that, whatever it-or any inherent power-permitted,
the order directed against Joseph Oat was impermissible, as the presence
of a Joseph Oat corporate representative would not foreseeably prompt
settlement since Oat had made it clear it would not agree to pay any
money.
In dissent, Judge Coffey was even more cautious about inherent
power. He was "convinced that Rule 16 does not authorize a trial judge
to require a represented party litigant to attend a pretrial conference together with his or her attorney because the rule mandates in clear and
unambiguous terms that only an unrepresentedparty litigant and attorneys
may be orderedto appear."'122 While judges do possess some degree of
inherent authority, "this authority is limited."'1 23 Judge Coffey said that
if we wish to recognize more expansive power, "let it be accomplished
through the accepted channels of the Supreme Court and Congress of
124
the United States."'
Judge Coffey outlined a "host of problems" that accompany too
broad a recognition of inherent power. Many concern the rights of litigants. One involves the use of inherent power "to substitute for the
subpoena power at pretrial conferences," raising "a due process question" because a subpoena is subject to a motion to quash and an exercise
of inherent power is not. 125 More generally, Judge Coffey found that the
recognition of broad inherent power already "has posed and will continue to pose a substantial invitation for judicial abuse."' 126 He feared
that the use of inherent power to compel represented parties to talk setdement would undermine the appearance of impartiality and propriety
and cause litigants confusion and dismay over judicial participation. 127
Finally, he said that "to permit judicial officers ...to exercise their personal judgment to require the attendance at pretrial conferences of enti121.

Id.

123.

Id.

127.

Id. at 662.

122. Id. at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 663.
125. Id. at 660.
126. Id. at 661.
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ties other than those specifically enumerated in Rule 16, upsets the delicate balance the Supreme Court and Congress struck between the needs
for judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual litigant.' 128
In his dissent, Judge Ripple found "that the most enduring-and
dangerous-impact" of the Kanne opinion was to upset the relationship
between Congress and the Judiciary. 29 He said that because the Rules
Enabling Act 130 was "designed to foster a uniform system of procedure
throughout the federal system,"' 131 it "hardly contemplates the broad,
t32
amorphous, definition" of inherent power rendered by Judge Kanne.
He concluded that "Congressional concern for uniformity of practice in
the federal courts" will be damaged and that each individual court will
33
be encouraged "to march to its own drummer.'
In his dissent, judge Manion echoed the views of other dissenters.
He reiterated that "judicial high-handedness" will be encouraged, additional expense to litigants will be incurred, and damage will ensue to the
"appearance of fairness" in the trial courts. 1 34 He opined that inherent
power cannot be "a license for federal courts to do whatever seems necessary to move a case along"; it should only be employed "to fill gaps
left by statute or rule."' 135 Thus, "where a statute or rule specifically addresses a particular area, it is inappropriate to invoke inherent power to
36
exceed the bounds the statute or rule sets."'
C. Stretching the Written Laws
In contrast to the Heileman dissents, another appellate court, in In re
Novak,137 seemed receptive to stretching the 1983 version of Rule 16 to
find that certain parties with attorneys could be ordered personally to
attend pretrial settlement conferences. 38 The court explained that in
two circumstances problems arise at settlement conferences attended
only by attorneys. The first is when the otherwise represented party re128. Id. at 662-63.
129. Id. at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
131. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 666.
134. Id. at 670 (Manion, J., dissenting). He does not mention Judge Ripple's fear that there will
be a move away from uniformity or Judge Coffey's due process concerns.
135. Id. at 666. By contrast, Judge Posner would "hesitate to infer inadvertent prohibitions" by
federal rulemakers on powers necessary for trial courts to function successfully. Id. at 657 (Posner,
J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting).
137. 932 F.2d 1397 (llth Cir. 1991).
138. Id. at 1407 n.19 (finding that "there is a colorable argument").
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fuses to delegate to the attorney full settlement authority. 139 The second
is when a nonparty insurer who is in charge refuses to delegate settlement authority to either the named party or its attorney. 140 In these
situations, the "pretrial conference participant's ability to discuss settle141
ment is impaired, and the value of the conference may be limited."'
Thus, while Rule 16 does not expressly allow attendance orders "directed at represented parties or nonparty insurers," 142 the court found
that such orders were nevertheless available under Rule 16.143 Judicial
authority was found in two sources. One was the inherent power of the
court;14 4 the other involved an interpretation of Rule 16.145 Beyond inherent power, the court found that "a party who refuses to give full settlement authority to his attorney and who retains control over settlement
146
negotiations is, in fact, his own attorney for settlement purposes."'
Because that party is then an unrepresented party for settlement purposes, the 1983 version of Rule 16, as interpreted, could permit the
court to compel the party's attendance at settlement discussions. 147 If a
nonparty insurer is in charge, the insurer's attendance can be accomplished through an order directed at the insured; 148 at least, this is true in
a case such as Novak, where an employee of the defendant's insurer,
Roger Novak, had the authority to make settlement decisions and the
149
interests of the insurer and the insured are "aligned."'

139. Id. at 1405-06. Such a refusal is not blameworthy and is actually promoted by attorney
conduct standards. On such delegations see Jeffrey A. Parness & Austin W. Bartlett, Unsettling
Questions Regarding Lawyer Civil Claim Settlement Authority, 78 OR. L. REV. 1061 (1999).
140. Novak, 932 F.2d at 1405-06. The court ultimately holds that it is this situation which is
before it and finds that the court is "unauthorized, by statute, rule, or its inherent power, to order
Novak, an employee of the defendants' insurer, to appear before it to facilitate settlement discussions." Id. at 1409.
141. Id. at 1406.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1408.
144. Id. at 1406-07 & n.18 (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648,
653 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)).
145. See id. at 1407 n.19 (construing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure liberally).
146. Id.
147. See id. ("[T]here is a colorable argument that Rule 16, on its face, empowers the court to

order such a party to attend a pretrial settlement conference; the party is an unrepresented party with
respect to settlement, and, thus, his attendance is crucial.").
148. Id. at 1408.
149. Id. at 1408 & n.20.
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D. Abuses ofAuthority
Of course, discretion in the exercise of judicial authority in pretrial
conferencing should not be abused. Certain general guidelines on such
discretion can be gleaned from a few of the opinions in Heileman, including concerns about "ignor[ing] the value of other people's time"; 50
undermining the appearance of impartiality and propriety;' 5' and, "the
expense and imposition on litigants."' 152 In Heileman, these concerns, of
course, involved judicial authority over settlement rather than trial
preparation conferences. The potential for judicial abuse seems greater
with settlement conferences, especially "at a time of heavy, and growing,
15 3
federal judicial caseloads."'
In Heileman there were also findings in some opinions that any assumed judicial authority to schedule settlement conferences requiring
attendance by represented parties was employed abusively against Joseph Oat. Here, too, guidelines appear. Judge Posner found particular
abuse because at the time of the order demanding an appearance by a
Joseph Oat official with "full settlement authority," Joseph Oat "had
made clear that it was not prepared to settle the case on any terms that
required it to pay money."' 154 For Judge Posner, the abuse of Joseph
Oat was compounded because "no one officer of Oat may have had
authority to settle" and thus "compliance with the demand might have
55
required Oat to ship its entire board of directors" to the conference.
E. Confusion Illustrated
Given the differing views and concerns in Heileman and Novak, it
would not be surprising if confusion arose about the parameters of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, its state law counterparts, and unwritten
inherent judicial authority in settlement and trial preparation
conferencing.'5 6 Confusion would be less likely if written pretrial con150. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Posner, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 670 (Manion, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 658. Judge Posner characterized the demand as "arbitrary, unreasonable, willful, and
indeed petulant," id., a view shared by Judge Manion, id. at 670 (Manion, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 658 (Posner, J., dissenting).
156. See, e.g., 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

16.04[l][a] (3d ed.

2000) wherein Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil says this about Rule 16:
The huge range of practices under Rule 16 among sitting federal judges is one of the
more unnerving facts of litigation life that confronts the contemporary lawyer. Because
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ference laws, such as Rule 16, were reformulated. Until changes are
made, troubling cases will likely continue.
Prattv. Philbrook'5 7 is one such troubling case, with a rather bizarre
outcome that likely would have been avoided if a more comprehensive
pretrial conferencing authority were expressly recognized. Pratt involved a two-vehicle accident causing Mary, a passenger in her sister
Rita's car, to sue Kelley, the driver of a pick-up truck, in a federal district
court. 158 Kelley was represented by counsel provided by his insurer,
General Accident. 59 A settlement conference was held at which attorneys for Mary, Rita, and Kelley were present, as was a claims adjuster for
General Accident.160 Plymouth Rock, Rita's insurer, which had a subrogated claim for $5000 against Kelley because Rita had already received
money from it for damage to her car, was not present.' 61 The lien held
by Plymouth Rock "was not explicitly mentioned during the conference," though "[a]ll counsel knew" about it.162 The settlement conference led to an agreement by General Accident to pay the $100,000 policy limit,1 63 with the counsel for Mary and Rita "assur[ing] the court that
there would be no problem negotiating the division of the $100,000
between their clients."' 164 The conference led to a dismissal without
this range can be so great, even within the same district court, counsel must take special
care to ascertain the specific rules and expectations of each district judge and magistrate
judge to whom their cases are assigned....
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally promote some commonality
of practice between different judges and between different federal courts, so much flexibility has been built into Rule 16 that the Rule itself does relatively little to advance the
cause of uniformity. In fact, Rule 16, perhaps more clearly than any other rule, reflects
an express rejection of the notion that one procedural size fits all cases. To equip judges
to fashion case development plans that are tailored to the needs to individual cases, the
Rule necessarily confers a great deal of discretion on the individual judges who apply it.
In addition, Rule 16 recognizes the authority of district courts, by local rule, to create
specialized sets of procedures for various categories of actions. Responding to this invitation, many courts have adopted elaborate sets of specialized provisions that apply only
to certain kinds of cases.
Id. (citation omitted).
157. 38 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D. Mass. 1999).
158. Id. at 65.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 65-66.
162. Id. at 66 (quoting Pratt v. Philbrook, 174 F.R.D. 230, 232 (D. Mass. 1997)).
163. Id.
164. Id. At least counsel for Rita may have owed duties to Rita's insurer in negotiating and
implementing any division. Compare Greenwood Mills, Inc. v. Burris, 130 F. Supp. 2d 949, 960
(M.D. Tenn. 2001) (finding under Tennessee law that "[i]f a beneficiary's lawyer knows that his

client's insurer is subrogated to his client's claim to the extent of benefits paid, and the lawyer plays

,a part in attempting' to prevent his client's insurer from collecting the amount due it under the in-
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prejudice, subject to a reopening within sixty days if a "settlement is not
consummated by the parties."' 165 The agreement fell apart because there
was no arrangement for payment of the subrogated claim.1 66 The sixty
days passed, however, and the case was pronounced dead. 67 Thereafter,
Mary's counsel asked the court to vacate the dismissal. 168 This request
was denied. 169 The denial was appealed, leading to a remand. 70 The
case finally ended when the appellate court affirmed a denial of the motion to vacate. 171 Thereafter, Mary sued Kelley in a new federal court
lawsuit for wrongfully repudiating the settlement agreement, prompting
72 Mary lost on her claim. 173
a counterclaim for abuse of process.
The trial judge in the first case clearly recognized that he had the
authority to preside over a settlement conference attended by interested
nonparties.' 74 Present at the settlement conference were Rita's attorney
(who had been ordered to attend) as well as a claims adjuster working
with Kelley, who may not have been an agent of Kelley depending upon
the alignment of interests between Kelley and his insurer, General Accident. 75 But that trial judge did not ensure (or perhaps even request) the
attendance of all interested nonparties.' 76 Thus, Plymouth Rock, an insurer holding a lien on any insurance proceeds benefitting Rita, was absent though its interest was known to all named parties and their counsel, as well as to Rita and to Kelley's insurer. This absence seems to
have caused General Accident to refuse to pay the $100,000 because any
such payment might not release General Accident from any liability to
sured's agreement with the insurer, the lawyer will not escape liability") (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Gilreath, 625 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tenn. 1981)), with Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Hofmann, No. 01-C-2470, 2001 WL 914469, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2001) (declining to follow
Greenwood Mills in an ERISA case, but noting that supplemental jurisdiction should be exercised
over related state law claims).
165. Pratt,38 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (quoting Pratt, 174 F.R.D. at 233).
166. Id. The sisters had agreed on a 85%-15% split, with the bulk going to plaintiff. Id. However, the $5000 subrogated claim became a "sticking point" in the finalization of the settlement. ld.
167. Id. The court explained the sixty-day order of dismissal "means that the case falls off-is
disposed of for purposes of my record but remains in limbo for sixty days and can be hauled back to
life again if there are any problems wrapping up the case." Id. (quoting Pratt, 174 F.R.D. at 233).
168. See id. (noting that Mary's counsel wrote the court asking for a trial date because settlement
was not reached and that the court treated his request as a motion to vacate the dismissal).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 66-67.
172. Id. at65, 70.

173. Id. at 70.

174. Pratt v. Philbrook, 174 F.R.D. 230, 232 (D. Mass. 1997). Though Rita was not a named
party, her attorney was present at a settlement conference. Id.
175. Id.; see also In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1408 (1 th Cir. 1991) (noting that the interests of
an insured and an insurer are "aligned" when there is no dispute over insurance policy coverage).
176. Pratt, 174 F.R.D. at 232. Though Plymouth Rock was a nonparty with a lien, it did not
attend the conference. Id.
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Plymouth Rock.177 A written pretrial conference law recognizing the
varying ancillary and inherent powers available under Kokkonen easily
could have altered the unfortunate approach in Pratt, which neglected
the interests of Plymouth Rock. As with Rita's claim against Kelley, the
claim of Plymouth Rock against the policy proceeds held by General
Accident may not have been triable on the merits in a federal district
court. Yet, as in Matsushita, it nevertheless could have been included in
the settlement as it was a factually-related (if not "factually interedependent") ancillary claim to Mary's claim against Kelley. Alternatively, it
could have been triable, as was the law firm's claim against Bilzerian in
Cluett, perhaps pursuant to the inherent powers necessary for successful
court functioning.
IV. REFORMULATED PRETRIAL CONFERENCE LAWS

Confusion over the breadth of judicial authority in pretrial
conferencing would dissipate considerably if there were more particular
written civil procedure laws. Inquiries into the relationships between
written laws and any ancillary or inherent power, as well as into the elasticity of the written laws themselves, would become unnecessary, or at
least less difficult, if written civil procedure laws explicitly addressed judicial pretrial conferencing authority over unpresented claims and interests and over nonparties.
Consider, for example, how the Novak decision would have been
approached if the proposal eliminated from the 1993 version of Federal
Rule 16 had been in place. It simply declared that a "court may require
that parties, or their representatives or insurers, attend a conference to
consider possibilities of settlement."' 178 Such a rule would have allowed
the court to compel directly the attendance of senior insurance analyst
Roger Novak, thus eliminating the need for the court to consider em177. The U.S. Court of Appeals stated the general rule in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Mazzola, 175
F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1999):
Where a third party tortfeasor obtains a release from an insured with knowledge that
the latter has already been indemnified by the insurer or with information that, reasonably
pursued, should give him knowledge of the existence of the insurer's subrogation rights,
such release does not bar the insurer's right of subrogation. "The authorities are in
agreement that a release given to a tort-feasor who has knowledge of the insuier's rights
will not preclude the insurer from enforcing its right of subrogation against the wrongdoer." Otherwise, a release would operate as a fraud upon the insurer.
Id.at 260-61 (citations & footnote omitted) (quoting Silinsky v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 289 N.Y.S.2d
541, 545 (App. Div. 1968)).
178. ProposedRules, supranote 40, 137 F.R.D. at 85.
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ploying an order against a party to get to its nonparty insurer's agent and
thus authorizing the order whether or not the defendant/insured and
the nonparty insurer's interests were "aligned."' 79 Such a written rule is
already in place in Ohio, originating in 1993.180
Today, some local federal district court rules also expressly permit
settlement conference attendance orders directly against insurers. For
example, Local Civil Rule 16.1(c) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan says: "Furthermore, at all conferences designated as settlement conferences, all parties shall be present, including, in
the case of a party represented by an insurer, a claim representative with
authority adequate for responsible and effective participation in the conference."' 181 And, Local Civil Rule 16.8 in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Michigan says: "In cases where an insured party
does not have full settlement authority, an official of the insurer with
authority to negotiate a settlement may be required to attend."' 82 Arguably, such rules do prompt the undermining of "Congressional concern for uniformity of practice in the federal courts" feared by some
83
judges in Heileman.
Beyond insurers, other nonparties may be quite important in facilitating settlement. Such nonparties might be compelled, or at the very
least invited, to attend settlement conferences. Such nonparties were, or
were likely, present at pretrial conferences in some of the earlier discussed cases. First, an attorney who has been fired, substituted, or dismissed from a civil action and thus who no longer represents a party in
the action may have a fee dispute with the former client who remains a
named party in the action. 184 Thus, in Cluett, Bilzerian had a fee dispute
with Latham and Watkins. 185 Had the applicable pretrial conference law
179. In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1408 & n.20 (11th Cir. 1991). Where their interests are not
aligned, as where the insurer denies insurance coverage sought by the insured, the presence of both
the insurer and the insured can prompt a settlement of the coverage issue, which may then prompt a
settlement of the claim presented by the injured party against the insured wrongdoer.
180. OHIO R. Civ. P. 16. According to the Staff Note accompanying the 1993 amendment, the
new provision was "meant to be declarative of existing practice and to work no substantive change
in the powers of the court or in the obligations of parties or their attorneys or representatives." Id.
staff note. The Note cited Repp v. Horton, 335 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974), as well as several
local rules of common pleas courts. OHIO R. Civ. P. 16 staff note.
181. E.D. MICH. LOCALR. 16.1(c).
182. W.D.MICH. LOCALR. 16.8.
183. E.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 666 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
dissenting).
banc) (Ripple, J.,
184. Such attorneys also may have had contingency fee arrangements. See, e.g., Galanis v.
Lyons & Truitt, 715 N.E.2d 858, 863 (Ind. 1999) (finding that a successor contingency fee attorney
has an obligation to pay an earlier contingency fee attorney out of the successor's contingency fee, if
liability for the earlier fees is not explicitly contracted away).
185. Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. CPC Acquisition Co., 863 F.2d 251, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1988).
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expressly allowed the trial court to compel the attendance of the law
firm, or at least to invite its presence and to recognize its participatory
rights if it attended, Bilzerian's argument that there was no ancillary jurisdiction would have been far less appealing. Second, a named class
representative in a state or federal class action may be very interested in
related civil actions, perhaps involving similar classes with different
named representatives. In Matsushita, there were pending at the time of
settlement both a state court class action in Delaware and a federal court
class action in California. 186 Had the Delaware court possessed and exercised the express authority to compel the attendance of the California
class representatives, those representatives would have been less likely to
urge later that the Delaware case settlement should not apply to them.
Third, interested nonparties include persons who could join or could be
joined in a pending civil action. In Pratt,Rita's attorney was present at
187
the settlement conference although Rita was not a named party.
Seemingly, the settlement was reached only because both sisters were
present through their attorney-agents, though the settlement was never
enforced because a lienholder with an interest in one of the sister's settlement proceeds was absent.
Written pretrial conference laws compelling attendance of interested
persons and entities beyond parties, attorneys, and insurers already appear in some jurisdictions. Michigan Court Rule 2.401(F) states, in a
section entitled "Presence of Parties at Conference":
In the case of a conference at which meaningful discussion of settlement is

anticipated, the court may direct that persons with authority to settle the case,
including the parties to the action, agents of parties, representatives of lien
holders, or representatives of insurance carriers:
(1) be present at the conference; or
(2) be immediately available at the time of the conference. The court's
order may specify whether the availability is to be in person or by tele188
phone.

The identity of interested persons and entities can be facilitated by laws
like Local Civil Rule 3.1(f) of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, which provides that when a complaint is filed, it must
be accompanied by "a separately signed certificate of interested persons
186. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 370 (1996).
187. Pratt v. Philbrook, 38 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D. Mass. 1999).
188. MICH. CT. R. 2.401(F).
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that contains a complete list of all persons, associations of persons,
firms, partnerships, corporations, guarantors, insurers, affiliates, parent
or subsidiary corporations, or other legal entities who or which are financially interested in the outcome of the case." 189 Local Civil Rule 7.4
provides that the "responsive pleading" must also be accompanied by a
similar certificate. 90
Together, the Michigan and Texas laws do not embody fully the judicial authority necessary for trial courts to prompt attendance of nonparties at pretrial conferences. And neither speaks to individual rights
when such authority is employed or to guidelines on how expanded judicial pretrial conferencing authority should be employed. 191
New written civil procedure laws should contain the broad language
of Local Texas Rule 3.1 with the clear purpose of the Michigan court
rule. 192 These new laws should allow trial court judges not only to compel the attendance of certain persons necessary for just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution, but also to extend invitations to other persons
whose presence would be helpful but could not be mandated. 193 By expressly allowing invitations to certain nonparties, trial courts could better
strike appropriate balances between individual rights and the needs of
judicial administration. Rita, the sister in Pratt, is the type of nonparty
who the court might only invite. The Matsushita'94 and Cluett 95 cases
illustrate types of nonparties who might be compelled to attend pretrial
conferences, for both the absent class members in Matsushita and the
law firm in Cluett appear to have been subject to trial court compulsion.
Distinctions between compelled and invited attendees are illustrated in
the new Maine Civil Procedure Rule 16B(o, effective January 1, 2002,
189. N.D. TEX. LOCAL R. 3.1(0. If a large group of persons or firms can be specified by a generic description, individual listing is not necessary. Id.; see also N.J.R. Civ. P. 4:5-1(b) (stating
that initial pleadings should include names of any nonparties who are subject to joinder due to potential liability to any party).
190. N.D. TEX. LOCAL R. 7.4.
191. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 662-63 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (stating that a judge's actions must conform to the balance the
Supreme Court and Congress reached between "the needs for judicial efficiency and the rights of the
individual litigant").
192. The primary goal behind Rule 3.1 seemingly was to afford trial judges better insight into
possible recusal grounds. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Gen. Order No. 48 (Feb. 22, 2000) (stating that the
policy behind a new and similar certification standard involving interested entities or persons is to
allow the court to "evaluate any need for disqualification or recusal early in the course of any case");
S.D.N.Y. LOCAL Civ. R. 1.9; E.D.N.Y. LOCAL Civ. R. 1.9.

193. Such a distinction helps insure that judicial power does not employ a broader inherent
power as a substitute for the narrower subpoena power. See, e.g., Heileman, 871 F.2d at 660 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that judges could use inherent power to expand the subpoena
power improperly).
194. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
195. Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. CPC Acquisition Co., 863 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1988).
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which says alternative dispute resolution conference "attendees shall
include... [i]ndividual parties ...[a] management employee or officer
of a corporate party ... [a]n adjuster for any insurance company providing coverage potentially applicable to the case .... Counsel for all
parties; and . . . [n]onparties whose participation is essential to settlement discussions-including lienholders-may be requested to attend
96
the conference."'
Besides addressing the types of participants, new written laws should
provide guidance on how discretionary judicial authority in pretrial
conferencing should be exercised.1 97 Such laws would prompt more
"uniformity of practice" and fewer marches to individual drummers.1 98
Guidelines should include the proposition that when "authority to settle" is important, those commanded or invited to attend must be known
to have such authority. In Heileman, a corporation was ordered to send
a representative with settlement authority. Yet it was suggested that "no
one officer ...may have had authority to settle" and thus "compliance
with the demand might have required [the corporation] to ship its entire
board of directors."' 199 Written guidelines should also include protections against undermining the appearance and reality of impartiality of
trial court judges at any later trials;200 recognize the differences between
a pretrial settlement conference where there is and where there is not
the need for later court approval of any settlement;201 and promote re196. See Amendments to Maine Rules of Civil Procedure to Implement Alternative Dispute
Resolution Procedures in Superior Ct., No. SJC-1 1 (effective Jan. 1, 2002) (amending ME. R. Civ.
P. 16 and adopting ME. R. Civ. P. 16B).
197. There has been little guidance to date. The Advisory Committee stated in regard to the 1993
amendments to Rule 16:
Finally, it should be noted that the unwillingness of a party to be available, even by
telephone, for a settlement conference may be a clear signal that the time and expense involved in pursuing settlement is likely to be unproductive and that personal participation
by the parties should not be required.
1993 Rule, supra note 32, 146 F.R.D. at 605.
198. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 666 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
199. Id.at 658 (Posner, J., dissenting). Surprisingly perhaps, it is sometimes difficult for trial
judges to learn who has authority to settle Judicial inquiries can raise issues of privileged attorneyclient communications (where delegation of authority from client to attorney may have occurred).
See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370 at 161 (1993) (stating that absent the client's consent, an attorney should not reveal to the trial judge any settlement
authority limits or the advice of an attorney); see also Carver v. Condie, 169 F.3d 469, 473 (7th Cir.
1999) (finding that the settlement authority of the county sheriff on behalf of the county is unclear
under Illinois law).
200. See, e.g., C.D. ILL. LOCAL R. 16.1(B) ("The settlement conference in a matter to be tried to
the court shall be conducted by a judge who will not preside at the trial of the case.").
201. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be ...compromised without the
approval of the court ....); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.25 (West 1997) (requiring court approval of
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spect for "the value of other people's time" 20 2 by encouraging distance
20 3
participation (e.g., by phone).
VI. CONCLUSION

The civil case box described in contemporary written civil procedure
laws contains presented claims and named parties. Yet, civil litigation in
American trial courts today frequently involves unpresented claims, as
well as related interests (e~g., attorney fees) and nonparties (e.g., insurers
and lienholders). Written laws are occasionally "enhanced" by ancillary
and inherent power case precedents, but the continuing use of such
precedents undermines a desired uniformity, undercuts the role of legislators and judges in court rulemaking, and promotes confusion. Written
civil procedure laws on pretrial conferences geared to settlement or to
trial preparation are particularly in need of reform. As in 1983 with the
1938 version of Rule 16, contemporary written pretrial conference laws
are outdated. They should be reformulated to provide clarity204 and to
better reflect the contours of ancillary and inherent power recognized
under the Kokkonen and the exercises of such authority in cases like Matsushitaand Cluett.

settlements in certain Wrongful Death Act cases involving minors); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/502(b)
(1999) (limiting the binding effect on trial courts of party agreements in marriage dissolution cases
on child custody, support and visitation matters).
202. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
203. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(f)(1) (Supp. V 1999) (stating that to the "extent practicable" in
a prisoner civil rights case where "the prisoner's participation is required or permitted," proceedings
"shall be conducted by telephone, video conference, or other telecommunications technology without removing the prisoner from the facility in which the prisoner is confined").
204. In 1993, the Advisory Committee noted that the explicit expansion of those subject to pretrial conferencing authority would help "eliminate questions ...regarding the authority of the court
to make appropriate orders." 1993 Rule, supra note 32, 146 F. R. D. at 603 advisory committee's
note.

